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The Claimant was a solicitor in a law firm. Following the termination of her employment she brought proceedings in the employment tribunal against that firm, alleging both unfair dismissal and sex discrimination. The proceedings were eventually settled.
The Claimant subsequently obtained employment with another solicitor's firm subject to references. Her formerline manager was given as a referee but he gave a negative reference. He referred to her poor relationship with the partners and the practice director, gratuitously mentioned that she had brought employment tribunal proceedings against her former employer and said she could on occasion be inflexible as to her opinions.
The new employer investigated further, including requesting a copy of the Claimant's tribunal pleadings, and decided to alter the terms of the offer to include a long probation period. The Claimant was unhappy with this and the job offer was eventually withdrawn. The Claimant brought further proceedings against both her old employer and the new employer.
The Tribunal found that the giving of a reference in these terms constituted a detriment and that the line manager had been significantly influenced in what he chose to say by the fact that the Claimant had brought sex discrimination proceedings against her former employer. The giving of the reference was thus an act of unlawful discrimination by way of victimisation.
In addition the tribunal held that the new employer had been specifically influenced in their decision to withdraw their job offer by the information that the Claimant had brought sex discrimination proceedings against her former employer. This constituted an act of a kind specified in section 4 (1) (a) of the 1975 Act (a "protected act"). Accordingly it held that the withdrawal constituted unlawful discrimination, by way of victimisation. Quantum was not decided at the hearing and whilst waiting for the remedy hearing the new employer decided to settle for £42,500.
That left only the old employer and line manager as parties to the claim. At the remedy hearing an award of £7500 was made to the Claimant. The award was for injury to feelings and not loss of wages. The Claimant appealed on 2 grounds. 1. that the award should have included loss of wages and 2. the injury to feelings award should have been higher.
In relation to the former the EAT said, "We have here a case in which the Appellant has suffered loss as a result of the combination of two wrongful acts – the Respondents' in giving (for a proscribed reason) the damaging reference, and Sebastians (new employer) in (likewise, for a proscribed reason) withdrawing the offer following receipt of that reference. The torts in question can properly be described as "concurrent" in the sense that they both contributed to the occurrence of the loss, but it is also important to the analysis that they are consecutive, the Respondents' act being earlier in time and thus necessarily further up "the chain of causation." The modern approach is to seek (at least so far as possible - the phrase "breaking the chain of causation" seems ineradicable) to confine the language of causation to the purely factual issue of whether the damage would have occurred "but for" the defendant's wrongful act."
It seemed to the EAt that "as a matter of policy and fairness the Respondents ought plainly to be liable here. When an adverse reference, given for an illegitimate reason, leads to an employer deciding not to make, or to withdraw, an offer to a candidate it is hard to see why that consequence should be regarded as too remote to attract compensation from the giver of the reference: so far from being remote,it seems to us both close and direct. As the case-law shows, the giving of damaging references is a not uncommon form of victimisation (or alleged victimisation). It would be most unsatisfactory if a claimant who lost the opportunity of employment as the result of such a reference were unable to recover substantial damages from his former employer. A remedy against the recipient of the reference will by no means always be available. It was only so in the present case because part of the damaging information supplied took the form of information about the earlier proceedings, which constituted a protected act, and Sebastians were held to have been motivated by that specific information: it would have been otherwise if Mr Hawthorne had given an equally damaging reference but not directly referred to any protected act."
As a result the case was referred back to the tribunal to assess an addition to the award of loss of wages.
The appeal against the quantum of the award for injury to feeling was however dismissed.
Interestingly the EAT suggested that the damages should be apportionment between the provider and recipient of the reference to reflect their culpability. cAn exercise which involves, essentially, an assessment of the parties' respective culpability and their degree of responsibility for the loss suffered was perfectly practicable.
Full Case
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